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Abstract. In the last two decades, public administrators have increasingly faced groups of people
with opposing views about the risks of exposure to environmental contaminants. Because of a series
of intriguing studies on risk perception, the situation is frequently seen, by scholars and adminis-
trators alike, as a con£ict between experts and citizens, and risk communication guidelines are
based on this interpretation. But the citizen-expert dichotomy appears fallacious when it is examined
in light of the ways citizens actually participate in environmental policy making. The dichotomy
overlooks the fact that citizens express their perception of risk largely through organized citizen
groups, and that these groups employ and have access to many experts. This essay uses a main-
stream environmental group and a number of grassroots environmental groups to illustrate the
point. It concludes that the more important con£ict is between experts who ¢nd environmental
pollution safe and those who ¢nd it hazardous.
Introduction
In the last two decades, public administrators have increasingly faced groups of
people with opposing views about the dangers of exposure to environmental
pollution. In the 1970s at Love Canal, at Three Mile Island, and at Woburn ^
to name prominent cases ^ some people argued that public health was seriously
endangered and that immediate action should be taken to prevent further
exposure; other people argued that the exposures in question were not hazard-
ous and that no protective action was necessary (Levine, 1982; Walsh, 1991;
Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990). Today in the 1990s we hear the same kind of
debate. For example, some people say that the nuclear waste repository at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada would pose a serious public health hazard; others
insist it would be safe (Erickson, 1994). Some people believe that synthetic
chemicals have caused large numbers of diseases; others say they have not
(Proctor, 1995).
These situations are frequently seen, by administrators and scholars alike, as
con£icts between experts and lay people ^ experts taking the position that
exposures to environmental pollutants are safe, lay people insisting the expo-
sures are dangerous (Wildavsky, 1995; Whelan, 1993). The idea that these are
controversies between experts and lay people has its ¢rmest empirical founda-
tion in the work of a group of researchers led by Paul Slovic who, since the late
1970s, have been studying `risk perception.' In dozens of published papers
Slovic and his colleagues have shown that experts and lay people make di¡erent
estimates of mortality rates and employ di¡erent kinds of rationality in making
those estimates. (For overviews see Slovic, 1987; Royal Society, 1992).
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In the initial demonstration that experts and lay people construe risk di¡er-
ently, Slovic, Fischho¡, and Lichtenstein asked three groups of ordinary people
to estimate death rates from various modern technologies. They then compared
these estimates with the estimates by a group of `experts' ^ people with `pro-
fessional involvement in risk assessment.' Finding that for nuclear power, pesti-
cides, and some other technologies, lay people estimated death rates as far
higher than they actually are, while experts made more accurate estimates, the
researchers set out to understand lay people's reasoning. They hypothesized
that lay people think of hazards not according to expected fatalities, but
according to the characteristics of the hazard. So they administered a new
questionnaire which listed possible characteristics. They found that the hazards
ordinary folk think are very risky are `unknown' (unobservable, unfamiliar,
with delayed e¡ects and so on) and `dread' (uncontrollable, not easily reduced,
inequitably distributed, etc). In contrast, the hazards people think are not very
risky are familiar and controllable (Slovic et al., 1979; 1980; 1981).
The researchers concluded that lay people aren't ignorant of what is `really'
risky. Rather, compared to experts, they employ a broader and richer kind of
rationality. Instead of considering technological hazards from a reductionist,
technical perspective, they take into consideration qualitative issues like fairness
and equity. They are concerned with costs and bene¢ts. They think about com-
munity cohesion and about future generations and about their personal lives. In
sum, they bring their beliefs and values into play (Slovic, 1987; Schwing and
Albers, 1980; Covello, 1983; Perrow, 1984; Fischho¡, 1985; Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 1987; Johnson and Covello, 1987; Krimsky and Golding, 1992).
From a policy perspective, whether and why people perceive something as
risky is important because people, as citizens, think their views should a¡ect
administrative decisions and environmental laws. Citizens demand that local
governments pay attention to their opinions about the citing of hazardous
waste incinerators, the dangers of living near abandoned toxic waste dumps,
and how nuclear waste should be regulated. And governments do listen to
citizens' views on these issues. But if experts, to whom governments also listen,
disagree with citizens about what is harmful, how much and in what ways
should citizens' perceptions of risk in£uence decision makers?
The risk literature o¡ers two kinds of answers, both under the rubric of `risk
communication.' To some scholars, while citizens' e¡orts to a¡ect government
should be respected, administrators should try to bring the citizens' ideas about
risk closer to the experts'. Thus, while agency personnel need to pay close
attention to citizens, the attention is primarily in order to understand why they
hold the ideas they do, to gain their trust, and to help agency representatives
explain scienti¢c and technical information to them e¡ectively (Environmental
Protection Agency, 1990: p. 24; Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, and Heath, 1987;
Michaud, 1991). As Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz put it after describing the public's
profound skepticism about the nuclear waste repository in Nevada, `Counter-
ing such attitudes and opinions will require extraordinary honesty, patience,
and skill in communicating the appropriate information to the public' (1993:
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p. 501). This perspective re£ects the prudent notion that environmental policies
should be based on sound science, but it appears to care more about reducing
citizen protest than reducing environmental pollutants. In K. S. Shrader-
Frechette's words, such scholars `ask how to mitigate the impact of risk percep-
tions (which they assume to be erroneous), rather than how to mitigate the
impact of risk itself' (1991: p. 78, emphasis in original).
A second answer says that citizens have something to add to administrative
decision making. In this view, citizen perceptions of risk, although stemming
from a kind of rationality distinct from the experts', are equally as legitimate.
Risk communication, then, should be a two-way process where agency person-
nel bring in technical data and citizens bring in social values (Slovic, Fischho¡
and Lichtenstein, 1982; Otway, 1987; Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Leiss, 1996;
Fischho¡, 1995). In Peter Sandman's words, `[T]echnical professionals are the
experts on what's hazardous and what isn't . . . citizens are the experts on what's
outrageous and what isn't' (Sandman, 1991: p. 40).
Several government institutions base guidelines for risk communicators on
the two-way communication idea. Among them are the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services' Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry
(ATSDR), New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection and Energy,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the (semi-governmental)
National Research Council. Explaining the citizens' role in communication,
ATSDR tells risk communicators, `People often care more about trust, credi-
bility, competence, fairness, and empathy than about statistics and details'
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994; p. 4). Other agencies
assign citizens a similar role. The EPA says that `lay people are the experts on
what frightens them and what would reassure them' (Sandman, 1986: p. 21).
The New Jersey agency says that `people's values and feelings are a legitimate
aspect of environmental health issues and .. . may convey valuable information'
(Chess, Hance, and Sandman, 1991: p. 19). And the NRC says, `[T]echnical
experts and public o¤cials . . . need to learn more about nonexperts' interests,
values, and concerns' (National Research Council, 1989: p. 21).
Certainly this all sounds like good advice. Two-way risk communication
where citizens have a genuine role is more democratic than one-way communi-
cation where agency people lecture citizens. But none of these guidelines makes
clear what agency personnel are supposed to do once they have listened. They
would appear to have three unsatisfactory choices. They can hear citizens'
explain why they think the exposure in question is dangerous, but support
environmental policies consistent with the experts' view that it is not ^ a choice
which replicates one-way communication and abrogates the claim that citizens'
risk perceptions are legitimate and valuable. They can accept citizens' reason-
ing about what is dangerous and protect them from environmental exposures
even when the experts say that the exposure are harmless ^ a choice imply-
ing that environmental decisions should be based on what people believe in-
stead of on what scientists know. Or they can work out some compromise
policy that doesn't protect people as much as people want to be protected but
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doesn't entirely negate scienti¢c knowledge either ^ a choice likely to satisfy no
one.
These dismal alternatives, however, may be less an inevitable dilemma than
an artifact of the smallness of the stage on which the risk communication
literature presents the situation. Most of it calls up the same kind of event: local
ad hoc neighborhood groups organized to ¢ght against a waste treatment
facility or polluting industry. But people's attempts to in£uence environmental
policies occur in many more arenas than this. To remember what they are, it is
useful to look at the scholarly writings on citizen participation. An inquiry
based on this literature suggests di¡erent understandings of risk communica-
tion, and questions the validity of the concept at the center of the risk percep-
tion literature: the citizen-expert dichotomy.
The logic of the citizen-expert dichotomy has already been weakened by
scholars who focus on the concept of expertise. Taking the constructionist
position that scienti¢c research inevitably re£ects the society in which scientists
work, these scholars argue that facts and values are inherently linked. They
show that science can neither form nor test theories without appealing to extra-
scienti¢c assumptions. Thus pure, objective knowledge is impossible (Kuhn,
1970; Mulkay, 1979; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Gieryn, 1995; Harding, 1986;
Longino, 1990).
Some scholars apply constructionism to risk perception. They say it is naive
to assume that experts know what is actually hazardous while citizens only have
perceptions about those hazards, for experts have no choice but to combine
empirical observations and value judgements (Fischho¡, 1989; Shrader-
Frechette, 1991; Otway, 1992; Wynne, 1992). Paul Slovic himself has joined these
scholars. In a recent essay he wrote that experts' assessment of risk `is inherently
subjective and represents a blending of science and judgement with important
psychological, social, cultural, and political factors' (Slovic, 1997: p. 23). But
illustrations of the value-laden nature of science frequently take risk perception
scholars on a circular route. Working in a context where the citizen-expert
dichotomy is the central concept, the lesson they usually draw is that experts
perceive risk through their values, and citizens perceive it through theirs (Kraus
et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1995). It is a short trip from there back to the dismal
choices I outlined above, for experts and citizens still occupy separate categories.
In this paper I try to avoid these choices by concentrating on the citizen side
of the presumed expert-citizen dichotomy. I argue that, just as much of the risk
perception literature oversimpli¢es the concept of expert by assuming that
experts only deal in facts, so it oversimpli¢es the concept of citizen by assuming
that citizens only deal in values. The literature makes this mistake about citi-
zens, I contend, by ignoring the organized groups through which citizens
in£uence environmental decisions and from which citizens get many of their
ideas about risk. It thus confuses `citizen' with `individual,' and fails to ask
about the expertise used by the organizations that actually represent citizens to
policy makers. To illustrate my argument I examine the means by which the
Natural Resources Defense Council came to its position on the health risks of
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exposure to pesticides, and the means by which community-level organizations
usually come to their decisions on the risks of exposure to industrial waste. I
conclude that in controversies over exposure to environmental pollution, we
are not seeing a con£ict between citizens and experts but between two groups of
experts.
Citizen participation
The literature on citizen participation identi¢es three avenues available to
people who hope to in£uence the government: through the electoral process,
through the policy making process, and through the agenda-setting process. In
the electoral process, citizens participate by voting and its attendant activities,
such as working for candidates or sending them money (Conway, 1985; Rosen-
stone and Hansen, 1993). In the policy making process citizens participate in
more varied ways: 1) by lobbying elected o¤cials or executive agency personnel
via writing letters, talking face-to-face with politicians and their sta¡, provid-
ing technical information, testifying at hearings, signing petitions, and taking
part in rallies or demonstrations (Verba, 1993; Berry, 1977; Piven and Cloward,
1977; Kweit and Kweit, 1981); 2) by ¢ling lawsuits (Wenner, 1990; Schlozman
and Tierney, 1986: pp. 154^160); and 3) by serving on administrative agency-
initiated citizen panels, commissions, and boards, or by attending or testifying
at agency-sponsored public hearings and meetings (Aron, 1979; Morone, 1989;
Creighton, 1981; Ethridge, 1987). In the agenda setting process, citizens par-
ticipate in more subtle ways. They try to a¡ect what the public construes as a
political problem and thus what the government is called upon to address. This
sort of citizen participation employs a wide variety of means, including skillful
use of the media, to reframe and thus draw new attention to old issues or to
transform accepted conditions into contested ones (Cobb and Elder, 1972;
Edelman, 1976; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992; Stone, 1989;Tarrow,
1994; Tesh, 1993).
In the context of environmental risk, the most important point about these
three ways to a¡ect government is that citizens can participate e¡ectively as
individuals only in the electoral process, and then only as voters and as ¢nan-
cial contributors to election campaigns. In other aspects of the electoral process,
and in the policy making and agenda setting processes, citizens have to organize
into groups to have much in£uence. The strange thing about the risk literature
is that it misses this point. Despite its recognition that people are socially-
embedded perceivers of risk, and despite its concern with the best way admin-
istrators can respond to organized citizens, the literature takes the individual
citizen, not the groups that citizens belong to, as the unit of analysis. This
formulation means that risk scholars ignore the activities and the composition
of the organizations through which most activist citizens acquire information
about environmental hazards. They thus misconstrue the actual relation be-
tween citizens and experts.
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I am not suggesting that risk perception research has completely neglected
organized groups. The initial studies in the ¢eld surveyed members of the
League of Women Voters and members of a business and professional organ-
ization. But there is no indication in the many publications risk perception
researchers have generated from these studies that they see these `members' as
anything but proxies for the public at large. In fact, some scholars criticize their
data for purporting to depict the views of the average citizen but being unrep-
resentative of the public. Some critics have done new studies in order to form a
more accurate picture of the average person's beliefs. (See, for example, Gould
et al., 1988). Certainly it is interesting to know how the typical American
perceives risk. But since, as I have noted, the main reason we care what people
think about risk is that people, as citizens, have a legitimate role in a¡ecting
government decisions, studies if individuals are not enough. We also need
inquiries where the unit of analysis is the organizations through which citizens
participate in making those decisions. I will start by elaborating brie£y on the
list of participatory avenues available to citizens.
Little needs to be said about the electoral process. Obviously, electoral
campaigns are group activities, and una¤liated individuals haven't much of a
role outside that structure. The group-nature of the policy making process,
however, is not so obvious, so here we have to look at the research. Although
many individuals do become angry or worried (or heartened) by political events
and, all on their own, write letters or make phone calls encouraging govern-
ment o¤cials to act, most constituent messages received in government o¤ces
are stimulated by organized groups (Rosenstone and Hanson, 1933: p. 228;
Cigler and Loomis, 1995: pp. 394^398; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986: pp. 184^
197). Moreover, especially on the federal level, it is seldom individual, una¤li-
ated citizens who testify at hearings or public meetings, talk face-to-face with
elected representatives and their aides or with agency personnel, and provide
technical information to legislators or to bureaucrats. More often it is the paid
sta¡, the consultants, or high-visibility volunteers (movie stars, for example)
representing the organized groups who actually do the work. In these cases,
citizens not only participate as members of groups instead of as individuals,
other people carry out the participation for them.2 The group-nature of citizen
participation is also illustrated when citizens sign petitions and attend rallies,
demonstrations, and other crowd events ^ all activities requiring organized
groups. And participation by litigation, although lawsuits with policy implica-
tions sometimes carry the name of a single individual, is usually done through
formally organized groups (Wenner, 1990).
The group-nature of citizenship is less clearly illustrated in the case of boards,
commissions, and public meetings. Sometimes citizen members speci¢cally
represent existing grassroots groups, sometimes they represent community-based
organizations, and sometimes they represent the public at large (Morone, 1984;
Brownlea, 1987; deLeon, 1992). There are apparently no data showing which
kinds of representation are most common. Similarly, it is hard to know what
percent of public meetings and hearings are attended mainly by una¤liated
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members of the general public and what percent are attended primarily by
people speci¢cally supporting an organized group.Without more data, we can
only conclude that on boards and at public meetings, citizens are sometimes
formally una¤liated and sometimes formally representative of organized
groups.
The concept of una¤liated citizen, however, fails to recognize the fact that
organized groups a¡ect citizens' ideas. In other words, it ignores the third way
that people can in£uence government: the process of agenda setting. Although
occasionally individual citizens can in£uence what the public, and the govern-
ment, construes as a political problem ^ consider the attention Michael Har-
rington brought to poverty in The Other America, and the e¡ect of Ralph
Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed ^ for the most part, agenda-setting is a collective
activity.
Work by members of feminist organizations has been a major factor in the
transformation in public opinion about women's role in society (Costain and
Majstorovic, 1994; Berry, 1989). The activities of civil rights groups fostered new
cultural ideals about racial equality (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; McAdam,
1996). A crusade by environmental organizations got Americans to think that
destruction of the Amazon rainforest constitutes a public problem (Keck, 1995;
Conklin and Graham, 1995). In all these campaigns, members of organized
groups rede¢ned an accepted condition or situation as a political problem and
worked to get the public to embrace the new de¢nition. Once they were success-
ful, the newly-de¢ned problem became a legitimate arena for government policy
making.
It's no mystery why the public participates in policy making and agenda
setting mainly through organized groups. For policy making, the complexity of
modern government makes it di¤cult for lone amateurs to learn what is going
on, to know whom to contact, and to know where to get useful information
(Truman, 1951; Kingdon, 1984: pp. 68^71; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). The
high level of scienti¢c and technical knowledge necessary to study the available
data and to discuss the rules and regulations they suggest, keep the una¤liated
average citizen from even understanding many of the issues (Barke, 1986;
DeSario and Langton 1987). In the case of agenda setting the cost in time and
money of campaigns that seek to construct new social problems puts these
avenues well out of the reach of most private citizens (Snow et al., 1986; Snow
and Benford, 1992). Perhaps most importantly, citizens seldom enter politics on
an empty state. Businesses are already there. Although their main energies go
into the production of goods or services, large successful businesses also em-
ploy lobbyists and run information campaigns in the expectation of getting
some control over the policies that a¡ect them. To have comparable in£uence,
citizens must also organize sizable and powerful groups (Reich, 1991; Zald and
McCarthy, 1979; Walsh,Warland, and Smith, 1993).
If, then, we care what citizens think about risk because they try to ^ and are
sometimes able to ^ in£uence government decisions, and if citizens do that
in£uencing primarily through groups, the question in environmental risk per-
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ception is not about the reasoning individual citizens use to decide that a
technology or situation or substance is hazardous. Instead the question is about
the reasoning organized groups use.
In£uencing the federal government
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is one of the dozen or so
`mainstream' environmental organizations that citizens join if they want to
in£uence national environmental policy.3 Through the NRDC sta¡ they can
lobby members of Congress, pressure bureaucrats at the EPA, testify at Con-
gressional hearings, sue violators of environmental laws and regulations, and
spread information to the general public about environmental hazards.4
In early 1989 NRDC caused a whirlwind of media stories, consumer fear,
and industry fury by announcing that preschool children are at high risk for
cancers and neurological disorders because they ingest high levels of pesticides
along with their fruits and vegetables. The announcement was dramatized by an
emotional story on CBS's `60 Minutes' which focussed attention on a single
registered pesticide, a growth hormone called Alar.5 Alar was licensed for use
on apples, so residues showed up in apple juice, apple sauce, and of course on
the raw fruit itself ^ all common foods in children's diets. The public responded
to the `60 Minutes' segment and to the print media coverage of the NRDC
report by refusing to buy apples and apple products. Public pressure was so
great that several cities (including Los Angeles and NewYork) took apples out
of school cafeterias, supermarkets put up `No Alar' signs, and Congress con-
sidered legislation that would ban Alar. After three months the EPA issued a
preliminary determination to cancel the use of Alar on all foods. Six months
after that the company producing Alar voluntarily withdrew its registration
(Jasano¡, 1990; Rosenberg, 1996; Rodgers, 1996; Marshall, 1991; Zeise et al.,
1991).
The whole a¡air generated an intense attack by a number of scientists. Joseph
Rosen at Rutgers University accused NRDC of using dubious toxicological data,
misrepresenting Alar's breakdown product as a genotoxin, incorrectly estimating
apple consumption, and relying only on worst-case scenarios (Rosen, 1990). In
Congressional testimony Frank Young from the FDA insisted that `there is not
a signi¢cant risk at this time facing the American people in the consumption of
apples.'6 John Moore from the EPA said, `The public is being led [by the
NRDC report] to believe that . . . their children are at very high cancer risk due
to Alar residues in apples and apple products. This is simply not true.. . .'7
Scientists at the National Food Processors Association faulted the NRDC
report for every one of its claims. Their spokesperson charged, `The basic
conclusions of the NRDC report rest on stringing together a series of improb-
able `̀ worst case'' assumptions and/or speculations. . . .In all of these areas,
NRDC has either gotten its facts wrong or has made methodological errors.'8
And a less economically-interested body of scientists, a committee made up of
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representatives from the World Health Organization and the Food and Agri-
culture Organization, reviewed the scienti¢c data and announced that Alar is
not a carcinogen even at fairly high levels of exposure (Marshall, 1991).
As these excerpts from the controversy show, it is possible to make the Alar
case look like one where citizens, acting through or inspired by an interest
group, press Congress and the bureaucracy to make new policies, while experts
criticize the science underlying the citizens' position. But the controversy can-
not accurately be characterized as a split between experts and citizens. In the
¢rst place, the NRDC study used only data from U.S. government scientists. In
the second place, it was done by just the sort of people Slovic and his colleagues
designated as experts. In the third place, a number of people outside of NRDC
who were also `experts' publicly endorsed the NRDC position.
NRDC's announcement about the danger of pesticide exposure to children
followed the completion of a two-year study and the publication of its ¢ndings
in a report called Intolerable Risk: Pesticides in Our Children's Food (Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1989). The report is a fairly dense technical trea-
tise, 136 pages long, with twenty-two tables, ten ¢gures, three appendixes, and
220 endnotes. It starts by describing two sets of data, both aquired from the
EPA. One lists the consumption rates for the twenty-seven food items most
frequently eaten by preschoolers. These data show that children, compared to
adults, eat more food relative to body weight, and that their consumption
patterns have changed signi¢cantly in recent years. The other data set lists the
residue levels of twenty-three pesticides known to have health e¡ects, and
commonly detected in the twenty-seven food items. Combining these two data
sets, Intolerable Risk calculates the amount of hazardous pesticides pre-
schoolers are exposed to in their food. The next step is to assess the health
outcome from this exposure. The report employs the results of animal bio-
assays, considers in its calculation the long latency period between exposure
and cancer, and develops a methodology which shows that between 5,500 and
6,200 `of the current population of American preschoolers may eventually get
cancer solely as a result of their exposure before six years of age to eight
pesticides or metabolites commonly found in fruits and vegetables' (p. 2).
As for the people who did the study, they were, like the `experts' Slovic and
his colleagues interviewed, people with `professional involvement in risk assess-
ment.' In the risk perception studies these included a geographer, an econo-
mist, a lawyer, a biologist, a biochemist, a government regulator, and an
environmental policy analyst (Slovic et al., 1979: p. 18). For NRDC they
included a public health professional, a computer programmer, a physicist, an
economist, a general scientist, and four lawyers.
The principal authors listed in Intolerable Risk are Bradford Sewell and
RobinWhyatt, both then NRDC sta¡ members.Whyatt had a master's degree
in public health at the time of the report, and ¢fteen years of experience with
toxic substances, ¢rst as executive director of Scenic Hudson and then at
NRDC. Sewell had an undergraduate degree in human biology, two years of
experience working on an earlier NRDC toxics project, and skill in computer
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programming.9 Whyatt and Sewell were aided by Glen Gilchrist, a consultant
to the project, who developed the basic computer modelling system for expo-
sure assessment.
The person responsible for performing the critical carcinogenic risk assess-
ments was another consultant, William Nicholson from the Department of
Environmental Medicine at Mt Sinai School of Medicine. Nicholson, whose
PhD is in physics, began developing risk assessment models in 1980. Before the
pesticide project at NRDC he had written criteria documents on asbestos both
for the EPA and the Swedish government. He had developed a risk assessment
model for asbestos for OSHA which the agency continues to use, and he had
done extensive reviews of PCB cancer risk for a government agency in Ontario.
The over-all editor of the report was Lawrie Mott, who holds a master's
degree in general science from Yale and had had nine years of experience in
pesticides at NRDC. She also served as a member of the EPA Administrator's
Pesticide Advisory Committee and had sat on the California Department of
Health's Cancer Policy Review Committee. Four NRDC lawyers worked on the
report: Janet Hathaway, Jane Bloom, Jacqueline Warren, and Albert Meyerho¡.
They have all served as o¤cial members of various EPA advisory committees
on the regulation of toxic substances.10
During the time they were working on the report, the authors consulted with
other `professionals in risk assessment.' Some of whom, like JohnWargo at Yale
and Richard Wiles at the Center for Resource Economics, were `shadow advi-
sors' unacknowledged in the ¢nal report. The most visible outside specialists
were the nine o¤cial peer reviewers: four MDs, four PhDs, and one EdD.11
There are several indications that the ¢nal product met the approval of
`experts' unconnected to NRDC, also. In Congressional hearings both Deborah
Prothrow-Stith, commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Health, and
Richard Jackson, chairman of the Committee on Environmental Hazards of
the American Academy of Pediatrics repeated NRDC's concern for the health
of children exposed to pesticides in food, and urged EPA to adopt stronger
regulations (U.S. Senate, 1989). Later, a team of researchers from the Califor-
nia Department of Health Services argued that NRDC could resonably have
made an even stronger case that exposure to Alar puts children at risk for
cancer (Zeise et al., 1991). And four years after Intolerable Risk, the National
Research Council (1993) published a study corroborating NRDC's major con-
clusions. It shows that age-related di¡erences in susceptibility to pesticides
exist, that children's diets di¡er signi¢cantly from adults' thereby exposing
them to greater amounts of pesticides, and that these early exposure are poten-
tially harmful.
One might respond to all of this ^ the statement that Intolerable Risk used
only data provided by federal agencies, the assertion that those responsible for
the report ¢t the category of experts, the citing of corroborating experts ^ by
asking whether the NRDC report is reliable. Did NRDC do `good science?'
But this would be the wrong question, for excellence is not the point here. The
point is rather that NRDC, one of the citizens' organizations through which
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ordinary people work to in£uence environmental policy, did not perceive the
risk of pesticides using a special form of reasoning. NRDC investigators did
deliberately choose one set of data on food intake rather than another, and they
did decide to use one toxicologic study rather than another ^ decisions which
angered their opponents (Rosen, 1990). But NRDC was doing science. The
organization didn't conclude that Alar is hazardous because Alar is `unknown'
and `dread.' It didn't publish an ethical treatise calling Alar risky because
exposure is involuntary, hidden, and uncontrollable. It didn't bring up values
like fairness and equity. Instead, NRDC used the same kind of reductionist,
scienti¢c rationality that Slovic and his colleagues labeled `expert,' and, ¢nding
that between 5,500 and 6,200 current pre-schoolers may eventually get cancer
from dietary exposure to pesticides, deduced that exposure is hazardous. It then
pressed for government action.
This story suggests that from the perspective of federal policy makers, the
citizens are experts. Individual citizens rarely express their opinions on the
hazards of environmental toxins directly to the government. Combining with
like-minded folk, they form organizations and hire professinals to do it for
them. And as the NRDC case shows, they sometimes also hire scientists to
develop the knowledge on which those opinions are based. Even when citizens'
groups like NRDC don't actually do research, that is, even when they take
positions based on literature reviews (which is more frequently the case) they
depend on experts. Thus, most of the time when policy makers hear from
citizens ^ that is, when members of citizen groups lobby policy makers, ¢le
lawsuits against them, or pressure them via advisory panels and public hearings
^ the citizens are representing scientists. This is not to deny that the average
person evaluates risk di¡erently from a professional in risk assessment. It is to
call attention to the di¡erence between the average person ^ the one re£ected in
risk perception questionnaries, and the citizen ^ the one trying to in£uence
government through the mediation of a group. And it is to suggest that the risk
communication scholars have it wrong: when governments hear opposing judg-
ments about the dangers of a technology, the two sides represent not lay people
and experts but two groups of experts.
In£uencing state and local government
But one might argue that the Natural Resources Defense Council is not the
kind of citizens' group that counts in a discussion of risk perception and risk
communication.While conceding that citizens who join mainstream groups in
order to in£uence national environmental policy use scienti¢c reasoning, one
might point out that risk communicators usually meet with quite di¡erent
citizens, those organized into neighborhood environmental groups. Neigh-
borhood groups are concerned with local and state policies and rarely have
scientists on sta¡ ^ indeed by de¢nition they seldom have sta¡s at all. It is
the people in these groups, one might argue, whose reasoning about hazards
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di¡ers from experts' and who depend on subjective values more than objective
science.
This objection to the focus on NRDC, however, ignores the agenda-setting
aspects of citizen participation. It assumes that mainstream groups have no
in£uence on grassroots groups, or on members of the general public not (yet)
formed into any such group. But the assumption is erroneous. From a policy-
making perspective, what NRDC did in the Alar case was get one registered
pesticide o¡ the market. From an agenda-setting perspective, it underscored
and re-broadcast a message that environmentalists had been promoting since
Silent Spring : scienti¢c studies show that synthetic chemicals can be harmful to
the environment and the public's health. One reason the NRDC study on
pesticides is important is that in some small way it is responsible for public
beliefs about environmental risk. Unfortunately, the risk perception researchers
failed to notice this. Instead of starting from the assumption that people think a
technology is risky because they have heard experts say so. The researchers
started from the assumption that people think a technology is risky because
the technology `has' certain characteristics. The researchers never asked their
respondents about the source of their views on risk, and they never asked
themselves who or what assigns characteristics to a technology.
But the NRDC message is not simply that synthetic chemicals are dangerous.
It is also that scientists think so. The NRDC message thus locates environmental
protest in the realm of provable hypotheses, of cause-and-e¡ect research, of
objective knowledge. This didn't have to be. As the risk perception studies
suggest, environmental activism could avoid emphasizing science. Opposition
to pollution can be situated in a moral realm, justi¢ed on the basis that exposure
violates social values like personal control, fairness, community cohesion, and
public information. However, NRDC and other mainstream groups use pri-
marily scienti¢c reasoning when they talk and write about risk, especially when
the topic is disease. So when grassroots groups began forming in the 1970s to
protest pollution there was an already-existing, widely-used framework within
which they could position their complaints.
At least ¢ve pieces of evidence indicate that grassroots groups have em-
ployed that framework. The ¢rst piece of evidence comes from organizing
manuals directed at community-level environmental organizations. The authors
of these manuals share a basic premise: scientists know what is hazardous and
citizens need that knowledge too. They list the government agencies from which
citizens can get toxicological, epidemiological, and regulatory information.
They direct readers to peer-reviewed scienti¢c journals, suggest they attend
professional meetings, and in some cases advise them to contact scientists
directly. They explain how to use the Freedom of Information Act and the
Community Right to Know provisions of the Superfund law in order to get
data from polluting industries. The show how to ¢nd and use computer data-
bases. They tell about private organizations that publish toxics information.
(Freudenberg, 1984b, Cohen and O'Connor, 1990; Gibbs, 1995; Feldman, 1996).
A second piece of evidence is the existence of two movement publications
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that pass scienti¢c ¢ndings on to environmental activists. The best-known in
grassroots circles is RACHEL's Environment and HealthWeekly, an independent
publication available both electronically and by mail. Started in 1983, it consists
of a ¢ve- or six-page essay on a current issue in environmental science, heavily
referencing the academic literature. The other is the Environmental Health
Monthly, a newsletter put out by the Center for Health, Environment, and
Justice (formerly the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste). Begun in
1988, it reprints in each issue one or more articles in their entirety from the peer
reviewed scienti¢c literature, along with a commentary. Both publications con-
centrate on new research indicating that environmental pollution endangers
human health.
A third piece of evidence is Nicholas Freudenberg's survey of 242 grassroots
environmental groups. `More than half the respondents,' he writes, `reported
that they attended conferences or meetings with scienti¢c experts, read govern-
ment reports, met with activists from other local or national environmental
groups, read newspaper articles in order to educate themselves.' Notably, the
respondents held information from scientists in higher esteem than that from
their fellow environmental activists: `Contact with scienti¢c experts was rated
to be the most valuable source of information (41 per cent of the groups),
followed by reviews of government records or reports (33 per cent) and con-
versations with other environmental activists (29 per cent)' (Freudenberg,
1984a: p. 445).
A fourth piece of evidence comes from case studies of grassroots environ-
mental organizations. At Love Canal, when the NewYork State Department of
Health maintained that only a few people were at risk from the leaking land¢ll,
the citizens' group turned to a cancer researcher at Rosewell Park Memorial
Institute. She helped them gather the health data that eventually justi¢ed their
relocation (Levine, 1982). In Alsea, Oregon, when the Forest Service denied
that pesticide spray endangered human health, the local residents got help and
advice `from scientists all over the United States' (Van Strum, 1983: p. 95). At
Woburn, Massachusetts, where the drinking water was contaminated with
chemical solvents and many children had leukemia, residents formed an alli-
ance with faculty at the Harvard School of Public Health to collect information
to dispute the ¢nding that no link existed between the water and the leukemias
(Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990). In Michigan during the protest over contami-
nated cattle feed, citizens drew on the expertise of a local veterinarian, a private
testing laboratory, the National Animal Disease Laboratory, and a USDA
research laboratory to counter the Farm Bureau Services' denial that a public
problem existed (Reich, 1991). After the accident at Three Mile Island, a
physics professor from U.C. Berkeley helped nearby residents challenge the
DOE's contention that no one had been harmed (Walsh, 1987). At Yellow
Creek, Kentucky, a physician and a psychologist helped people ¢ghting against
water pollution do a community health survey that linked the pollution with
disease rates (Cuoto, 1986). In Ann Arbor, Michigan, a group got help from
a chemist, an industrial engineer, a hydrologist, and a former member of a
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National Academy of Sciences committee to challenge the Department of
Environmental Quality's decision that it was safe to discharge contaminated
water into a local stream.12 In Flint, Michigan, residents protesting the state's
decision to allow siting of a hazardous waste incinerator in their neighborhood
were helped by a toxicologist at the University of Michigan School of Public
Health.13
A ¢fth piece of evidence comes from a study speci¢cally testing the idea that
citizens reason di¡erently from experts. Jeanne Jabonoski analyzed what she
calls the `knowledge' used by the citizen members of a Scienti¢c Advisory
Board overseeing a lead mediation project in Toronto. She argues that the
citizens, who represented an experienced neighborhood group, used technical
knowledge (knowledge about legal and regulatory, scienti¢c and engineering
issues), procedural knowledge (knowledge which facilitated the board's decision-
making process), and observational knowledge (knowledge of local conditions
and history) (Jabanoski, 1997).
These pieces of evidence that grassroots groups often use scienti¢c reasoning
to understand pollution should not be taken to mean that they all use it
rigorously. Anyone who has spoken with more than a few grassroots activists,
or been one, or attended public meetings where members of community groups
testify, has heard some activists who sound well informed about toxicology and
epidemiology, and others who seem to have a weak grasp on even basic scien-
ti¢c concepts. The pieces of evidence should also not be taken to mean that
grassroots groups limit themselves to scienti¢c reasoning. On the contrary,
individuals who join those groups are usually drawn to activism in the ¢rst
place by just the sort of passion that the risk perception scholars study. The
groups thus often employ emotional appeals and value commitments to mobi-
lize others, as well as to pressure policy makers. Most importantly, the evidence
should not be taken to mean that by using science, grassroots groups level the
playing ¢eld. Industries producing pollution have many more resources to
generate and disseminate scienti¢c information than do communities exposed
to the pollution. Nevertheless, the available record suggests that 1) when local
activists seek advice from other activists on how to win, they are told to arm
themselves with science, and 2) they frequently take this advice.
The available record is, of course, both incomplete and mixed. Some mem-
bers of grassroots groups brush o¡ the very idea that scienti¢c expertise is
necessary to understand the health hazards of pollution (Tesh and Williams,
1996). But it is a mistake to think that citizens in grassroots groups who see
environmental pollution as risky typically use a form of reasoning substantially
di¡erent from that used by professionals. More accurately, it is professionals
who tell them what is risky. On one level these professionals are the men and
women who write or publicly support reports like Intolerable Risk. On another
level these professionals are the men and women who work with grassroots
groups to generate and ¢nd scienti¢c data linking pollution with health prob-
lems. If members of a grassroots group take positions about environmental risk
that di¡er from the EPA's or the state health department's, they are probably
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not using di¡erent forms of reasoning. More likely, they are consulting di¡erent
scientists.
Conclusion
I have been arguing that the risk perception literature misunderstands the
con£ict over the dangers of environmental pollution because it ignores the
citizens' organizations through which people learn about risk and through
which they express their knowledge to governments. An examination of those
organizations suggests that the risk literature's distinction between lay people
and experts is falacious. Instead of ¢nding two groups of people, one thinking
about risk in terms of social values, the other thinking about it in terms of
scienti¢c facts, the examination discovers a single group of people, thinking in
terms of facts. The discovery should not be a surprise. In our culture, science is
the most prestigious form of knowledge. When powerful political actors have
already de¢ned the issue as scienti¢c, and already used scienti¢c reasoning to
claim that nuclear power, hazardous waste incinerators, or pesticide exposure
is safe, members of environmentalist citizens' groups have to be scienti¢c too.
This state of a¡airs raises questions about the political intentions of the risk
communication guidelines. The ATSDR's guidelines say that people who oppose
hazardous waste sites care more about things like trust than about statistics.
The EPA's guidelines teach that citizens are experts only on what is horrifying.
The state of New Jersey and the National Research Council tell public o¤cials
that their most important task is to consider people's interests, feelings, and
values. In light of the stories I've told in this essay, such guidelines look like
attempts to disenfranchise citizens. Citizens' groups work hard to locate and
generate technical information and to communicate that information to gov-
ernments. The advice to risk communicators, however, ignores these e¡orts.
Glued to the concept that lay people and experts perceive risk di¡erently, the
guidelines assume that citizens are heedless of data, and then de¢ne whatever
information citizens bring to the table as mere values. Thus the problem
becomes how to deal with citizens and their emotional ways of reasoning. Risk
communicators are urged to be sincere and tolerant with citizens, but the
guidelines assign agency people the role of wise parent, and citizens the role of
high-strung child. The scenario justi¢es limiting citizen participation. Beyond
this, however, the advice to risk communicators masks a critical public policy
problem.When citizens' organizations call attention to published studies coun-
tering the data on which administrators rely, or submit to government agencies
new information generated by their own consultants, the dilemma for agencies
is not how to combine two distinct kinds of reasoning. The dilemma is what to
do when experts disagree.
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Notes
1. The author wishes to thank Janet Hathaway, Lawrie Mott, William Nicholson, Carol Rose,
JohnWargo, RobinWhyatt, and the anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of this essay.
2. Many citizen groups do have periodic `lobby days' when hundreds of members gather in
Washington or the state capitol and swoop down on administrative and legislative o¤ces.
Such events deviate from the rule that lobbying is done by sta¡, but they do exemplify the
axiom that most citizens participate in policy making via organized groups. At the local level
the generalization about sta¡ doing the work is not true because grassroots community groups,
almost by de¢nition, have no paid sta¡s. Thus the members do the lobbying themselves, but
here again, it is groups, not individuals, who lobby.
3. The mainstream organizations include besides NRDC, the Environmental Defense Fund, the
Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society, theWorldWild-
life Fund, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, the Izaak Walton League, and the
Nature Conservacy.
4. For details see NRDC's quarterly publication,The Amicus Journal.
5. Alar was registered as a pesticide, but its purpose was not to deter pests. Instead it extended
the period of time fruits and vegetables remained on the branch, decreased dropping during
harvesting, and improved storage life (Rosenberg, 1996).
6. Dr. Frank E. Young, Administrator, U.S. Food and Drug Administration in oral Congres-
sional testimony (U.S. Senate, 1989: p. 23).
7. Dr. John A. Moore, Acting Deputy Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in
written Congressional testimony (U.S. Senate, 1989: p. 29).
8. Charles J. Carey, President of the National Food Processors Association in written Congres-
sional testimony (U.S. Senate, 1989: p. 91).
9. It's worth noting that Whyatt later left NRDC to get a doctorate at the Columbia University
School of Public Health, and Sewell now has both an MPH and a JD from Columbia University.
10. Information on the authors' credentials comes from telephone interviews during December
1994 with RobinWhyatt, Lawrie Mott, Janet Hathaway, JohnWargo, and William Nicholson.
11. The peer review committee consisted of Henry Falk, MD, American Academy of Pediatrics;
John Gussow, EdD, Columbia University; Steven Markowitz, MD, Mount Sinai School of
Medicine; Jack Mayer, MD, Columbia University; Herbert Needleman, MD, University of
Pittsburgh; Ian Nisbit, PhD, Nisbit and Co; Frederica Perera, PhD, Columbia University;
Marvin Schneiderman, PhD, National Academy of Sciences; Bailus Walker, PhD, SUNY at
Albany.
12. Information included in packet presented to the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality by Scio Residents for SafeWater at a public hearing in Ann Arbor, January 13, 1997.
13. Personal communication from the professor in question: Jerome O. Nriagu, Department of
Environmental and Industrial Health, University of Michigan School of Public Health.
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